Britain: Trade Union Movement more

International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 Britain, trade union movement 519 Britain, trade union movement Mark J. Crowley The Historical Context It was the lack of workers’ rights first emerging in the eighteenth century that highlighted the need for a representative body to campaign for workers’ welfare in Britain. The Combination Laws passed by Prime Minister William Pitt in 1780 and 1799 made it illegal for workers to lobby their employers for improved pay and conditions. This effectively made trade unions illegal. Opposition to the acts was led by trade unionist Francis Place, with Joseph Hume and Sir Francis Burdett leading the parliamentary charge. The acts were repealed in 1824, but a series of strikes erupted, leading the government to pass the 1825 Combination Acts, which effectively restored the powers of the previous act and reasserted their power over the workers, confining trade union roles purely to meeting to discuss wages. If they met under other provisos, they would be subject to arrest and prosecution, defined as criminal conspiracy in restriction of trade. The Conservative government under Benjamin Disraeli responded by passing the Masters and Servants Act in 1867, which ensured that those engaging in strikes could only be prosecuted for breach of contract, and criminal action could only be brought if it was deemed that the strike was aggravated. This prompted the head of the Conservative government, the Earl of Derby, to set up a Royal Commission on Trade Unions in 1867. However, he resisted calls for the inclusion of a working man in the Commission. Trade unionists refused to accept the report, as it was hostile to the existence of trade unions, and instead produced a report of their own. In short, they campaigned for trade unions to be given full legal recognition under British law. The Trade Union Congress successfully campaigned for the new Liberal government under William Gladstone to accept the proposals. This led to the passage of the 1871 Trade Union Act, which ensured that trade unions received full legal recognition under British law and that no trade union could be regarded as illegal. The result, however, was bittersweet. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, passed on the same day, made picketing illegal. However, the Trade Union Act provided the platform for the increased status and power of trade unions in the remaining part of the nineteenth century. One of the main motivations behind the formation of trade unions in the late nineteenth century was to politically represent the British working classes, who until then were denied the right to vote and did not have access to parliamentary representation. Their views were effectively ignored. Although the formation of International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 520 Britain, trade union movement the Independent Labour Party in 1905 and the introduction of the much-triumphed Representation of the People Act 1918 were heralded as major steps toward the political emancipation of the working classes, this did little to increase the power of the masses, who remained largely marginalized within a political framework dominated by an aristocratic, upper-class elite. It was they who prevailed as the dominant decisionmaking force. Secondly, working-class protests were not a new phenomenon in twentiethcentury Britain and had indeed been a distinct feature of the nineteenth century, in which disenchantment with governmental policies toward the workers was largely articulated through a series of popular protest groups, such as the Rebecca rioters (beginning in the 1830s), the Chartists (by 1834), and the Blanketeers (by the late 1830s). by the Conservative government, who refused to cooperate with the trade unions and forced the workers back to work. The 1927 Trades Disputes Act was passed to heavily regulate trade union activity, making strikes illegal without a mandate from a clear majority of all trade union members. Nevertheless, the label of an illegitimate, disparate “rabble” previously attached to popular protest movements prior to the creation of trade unions was now replaced with a movement claiming legitimacy at a far higher level. Leaders of nineteenth-century popular protest movements did little to address the difficulties attached to their “mob rule” image, which ultimately culminated in the acceptance by some and emulation by others of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ultimately, this failed to create a favorable image of working-class political concerns amongst the political elites. Conversely, trade unions claimed political status. Comprising elected officers, subscribing members, and a hierarchically defined organization, the perception of a coherently structured movement with a constitutionally defined aim and power structure was presented to the political sphere. Their purpose was to represent, through democratic means, the interests of the working classes. Twentieth Century The elevation of protest and political campaigning articulated through trade unionism at the beginning of the twentieth century provided a greater legitimacy to the working-class cause. The political presence of the trade unions would, in theory, ensure the eschewal of government mistreatment previously attributed to popular protest groups on the grounds of their non-political status. Nevertheless, trade union protests in the 1930s can be considered from two differing perspectives. First, internal protests occurred within the British Labour Party. Trade unions and affiliated organizations formed a significant part of these, serving merely to undermine the electoral and political stance of the parliamentary party. Second were external protests, in which trade union disaffection became publicly witnessed through marches, lockouts, and strikes. This formed the most prevalent component to contemporary anti-government reactions. However, their effectiveness remained constrained by far-reaching legislation passed in the preceding decades, especially the 1920s with the passing of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act in the aftermath of the 1926 general strike. During that strike all workers in the public services struck over the issue of pay and conditions for nine days in 1926. The trade unions called for this strike, arguing that the people deserved better pay and conditions for their work. However, the strike was crushed The 1920s: The “Internal” and “External” Politics of Trade Union Protests By the late 1920s, the fortunes of the British economy could be described as “mixed.” Britain had experienced its first major industrial dispute of the twentieth century, serving as a warning shot across the bows of the ruling elite. The general strike of 1926 had demonstrated the potential strength of the working class and the dangers of militant trade union protests. Contrary to the feelings of some Conservative members, within whom a deep-rooted desire was prevalent to unceremoniously smash the trade unions, the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, believed a more conciliatory stance was now necessary. He sought to integrate, rather than isolate, the trade unions into governmental business through promoting discussion and debate with major union leaders. Many politically important steps had already been taken. The appointment of Ernest Bevin as minister of labor, the merging of the Trade International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 Britain, trade union movement 521 Union Congress and the Workers’ Movement, the construction of Transport House in London to house Labour Party headquarters and the Trade Union Congress, together with the publication of the socialist newspaper, the Daily Herald, all provided an important platform for the furtherance of trade union activity. This, nevertheless, did not occur without the essential prerequisite of political concessions clearly exercised by the unions themselves. Rationalization as a means of securing increased growth at limited cost was an aspect dominating political discussion in this period and was prevalent in what became known as the “Mond-Turner” talks at the end of 1929. The talks, which included trade union leaders and senior government officials, were successful in brokering a deal between the conflicting parties. It was agreed that each side would exercise mutual respect toward their opposing political viewpoints, thus ensuring a cessation of hostilities in the interest of national development. Although ultimately these promises were not adhered to, it initially appeared that Baldwin had succeeded in finding a platform with which compromise could be reached between employers, trade unions, and the government, thus facilitating a move away from militant protest and toward professional collaboration in the national interest. Despite this accommodative stance, however, Baldwin’s success at the polls in the British general election of 1929 was undermined by the wider appeal articulated by the British Labour Party, which effectively used its newly acquired resources and capitalized on the inexorable rise of socialism amongst the working classes to espouse a socialist-loaded manifesto to the electorate. The manifesto, by the very nature of its title, Labour’s Appeal to the Nation, was suggestive more of a plea to a disillusioned electorate rather than a substantive political document. It promised amendments to trade union laws passed in the aftermath of the general strike, better working conditions, and Committees of Inquiry into the causes of and remedies to the depression in the cotton and iron industries. Baldwin’s desperate election machine appealed to the electorate for retention of their faith in the Conservative Party. Conservative election posters compared Britain to a cruise-liner heading straight toward the rocks, a fate they believed would befall Britain if the electorate were to elect a socialist government. Despite this desperate plea, it was the Labour Party, supported by the newly emancipated trade unions, who would taste victory at the polls. The economic event that followed shortly after the 1929 election could not have been foreseen by either the Conservative or Labour Party. The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 brought economic collapse on an unprecedented scale, and with it the inevitable and inexorable rise of unemployment in industries largely associated with the dominance of the British empire, including coal and steel. The catastrophic events that followed proved Baldwin’s cautionary economic policy of “Safety First,” which was a series of cautionary and conservative economic policies that did very little to address the root cause of the problem. This led to Baldwin being replaced by his predecessor, the socialist Ramsay MacDonald, who had been voted out of office in 1924, largely as a consequence of working-class disillusionment at his failure to implement socialist policies for the benefit of the working classes. Although he claimed to have learned his lessons from 1924, the evidence of this was not conclusive. The working-class feeling of betrayal provided the platform for the strengthening of trade unionism, articulated through high-profile protests in Britain during the 1930s. “Lockouts” and Protests against Working Conditions Protests escalated and adopted many different forms. Marches were accompanied by “lockouts,” where workers would refuse to enter their factories in protest against their working conditions. This provided further impetus for the strengthening of trade unionism in Britain. The first example of this can be seen by the government response to a union-supported strike in Yorkshire, northern England, in 1930, in which woolen workers refused to work in a protest against pay and conditions. Although the protest could not be considered a lockout on the same scale as that of the 1926 general strike, it acted as a means of demonstrating, both to the employers and the government, that the workers remained disenchanted with government employment policy and were again willing to take direct action as a method of seeking reform. The new minister of labor, Margaret Bondfield, International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 522 Britain, trade union movement intervened but provided little support to the disenchanted workers, who were forced to return to work in what was regarded as a humiliating defeat. Nevertheless, it later appeared that this protest had not been completely in vain. One of the earliest promises put forward by the Labour government was to reduce the length of the working day to a maximum of seven hours. The action of the British Miners’ Federation in pushing for this legislation proved to be instrumental. However, despite being open to this concession, the government was less conciliatory toward the Federation’s increased wage demands. In the closing stages of 1930, the seven-hour working day had become law but was largely confined to the mining industry. The miners’ call to bring the minimum wage legislation up to date from its previous 1912 index was duly rejected by Chancellor Philip Snowden, who argued that the coal industry, unlike in previous decades, would no longer receive generous subsidies from the state. This, amongst other marginal events in 1930, proved to be a catalyst for what became militant trade union protests for the remaining part of the decade, with shorter working hours and improved pay being the two major planks of union demands. This pragmatism nevertheless received considerable opposition from workers and political figures alike, especially David Lloyd George, Britain’s inspirational leader for the latter half of World War I, who claimed, in his 1929 general election manifesto, that the Liberal Party would “conquer unemployment” if it ever returned to power. Nevertheless, such was the acute nature of the economic crisis that befell Britain in 1929 that the commitment of the Labour government to implement socialist ideals was completely overridden by its desire to revive capitalism as a method of ensuring stability in the short term, a move provoking outrage amongst trade unionists and workers alike. Discontent amongst the trade unions, the Labour Party’s biggest supporters, led to many internal political protests, many advocated by senior trade unionists unhappy with the Labour Party’s apparent abandonment of its socialist credentials. These protests, in tangible political terms for the unions, achieved very little, and merely served to destroy the Labour Party from within, leaving the party susceptible to factionalism and depriving it of the united support of its loyal and financial support base, the trade unions. At the 1931 general election, the Labour Party was comprehensively defeated and replaced with a new coalition government comprising senior political figures from the three major political parties, united in crisis policymaking for the regeneration of Britain. A further assault came upon the fortunes of the British Labour Party with the defection of its leader, Ramsay MacDonald, to become the leader of this new coalition government. This coalition included both Conservative and Labour Party members of parliament working to incorporate a range of views to help solve the economic crisis. Coalition governments were only traditionally used in British politics during a period of crisis. The last coalition was during World War I, but MacDonald believed that such was the problem facing Britain, with unprecedented economic collapse, that a coalition was once again needed. However, his decision to form this coalition split the Labour Party spectacularly. This demise in the party’s fortunes effectively signaled not only the temporary capitulation of the party’s political quest for power, but also impacted considerably upon the influence, motivation, and status of their major financial Internal Protest: The Fall of the Labour Party and Decline of the Trade Unions The provision of employment with fair working conditions remained a priority for the trade unions throughout the 1930s, although prevailing legislation meant that their voices in support of these moves remained largely muted. Much to the annoyance of senior trade unionists, the new Labour government, despite their socialist ideals, remained opposed to the provision of an initiative which had been long supported by the trade union movement: the provision of a Public Works scheme. This scheme, funded by the government, would provide factories for the unemployed and guarantee employment in a period dominated by uncertainty and strife. Ironically, despite their bold claims of future economic reform whilst in opposition, the upheaval caused by unprecedented worldwide economic collapse forced MacDonald and his colleagues to follow a much more prudent economic course than originally advocated in his 1929 manifesto. International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 Britain, trade union movement 523 and “moral conscience,” the trade unions. Once again, in the same vein as their political vanguard, the trade unions were confined to the political wilderness, and furthermore lacked a strong political party with whom they could align and espouse their political demands. It could be argued that an axiomatic shift was occurring within British politics. What emerged was an increased bureaucratization of the political system, with the inception of Royal Commissions as investigative bodies developing strategies to alleviate the problems of unemployment and working conditions, which were the unions’ two major concerns. Moreover, the increased use of “economic experts” did much to marginalize the trade unions. Academics, articulating grand economic theories as the resolution to the nation’s problems, now occupied the political limelight. This merely served to relegate once more the trade unions from their recently revived status of relative importance, secured through agreements of mutual cooperation with the government, to that of marginality, with newfound economists appointed by the government as the arbiters of Britain’s future legislation in all public policy areas. To make matters worse, much to the anger of trade unionists, it appeared that even their most loyal members and supporters who had reached positions of authority, such as Ernest Bevin, were turning their back on the movement. Bevin, as early as 1931, when quizzed about government inaction vis-à-vis unemployment policy, contemptuously commented: “I know that I could be answered by the usual socialist philosophy, but when you go on a Royal Commission you have to deal with the facts as they are and the problem as it is.” In what could only be regarded as a conciliatory gesture, Bevin published a proposal, My Plan for the 2,000,000 Workless (1933), which gave some people the illusion that new jobs were actually being created. The reality, however, proved to be considerably different. Jobs were merely being redistributed, and unemployment remained at staggeringly high levels (above three million at its highest point in 1933), thus serving merely to fuel further resentment amongst trade unions, who became increasingly concerned about the welfare of their members. However, this, coupled with their political paralysis as a consequence of the legislation passed in the aftermath of the 1926 general strike, meant that there was indeed very little that they could do to register their discontent other than to turn away from the ballot box toward direct action, which became a distinct feature of trade union activity for the remaining part of the decade. Protests against the Means Test: The “Hunger Marches” Measures to deal with the unemployed poor could be traced back to nineteenth-century Disraelian politics, which is associated with the former prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli. He was famous for his several initiatives to help the poor, developing laws such as the 1834 Poor Law Act, which ensured that those who were out of work had payments from the state until they found more work. Moreover, the state would also help them to find alternative employment, although many people were forced to attend workhouses, where the conditions were harsh and people were forced to work long hours. The work they would do was also mundane (such as boot repairing) and they often worked for 16 or more hours without food and without breaks. Many revisions took place in the intervening period to these laws, but by 1930 one aspect of this legislation became a highly contentious issue for the working class. The development of what became known as the “Household Means Test” was extremely controversial. People’s eligibility to claim unemployment benefits from the state depended upon their ability to prove their destitution to the authorities. The intrusive nature of these investigations, commissioned by members of the Local Employment Exchanges, opened the lives of the poor to the scrutinizing eye of government-employed personnel, thus making the unemployed an object of ridicule. Government inspectors would be sent to claimants’ houses to see what assets they had, and this would be used as a basis for judging whether they would be eligible for state support. In many cases, officials would tell claimants to sell their possessions in order to raise money before they would allow them to claim assistance from the state. By its very nature, this test aimed to reduce dependency on the state by forcing the unemployed to seek employment, thereby eschewing the widespread humiliation and anguish brought about by resorting to this system. International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 524 Britain, trade union movement The government could not have foreseen the widespread protest that this would inevitably generate. These early protests culminated in what became known as the “Hunger Marches” of the 1930s. These marches brought together not only people confined to destitution by the existing laws, but also those in employment frustrated by their lack of power. The employers’ strength appeared to be increasing while workers’ rights, despite trade union prominence, appeared to be diminishing. As trade unions began to decline, the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (NUWM) remained strong. Protests were organized regularly, primarily against government treatment of miners in the aftermath of the 1926 general strike. The government now sought repayment from the miners who claimed state benefit during the strike, and cited the undertaking signed in 1926 by these workers, which signaled their compliance with this arrangement. The major grievance of the NUWM nevertheless was that in the aftermath of the general strike, the miners had experienced reductions in their wages, which had consequently made living conditions more difficult, and to a great extent led to the impoverishment of many miners. Demanding repayment under these unfavorable conditions appeared unreasonable. As the government refused to negotiate, trade unionists, together with extreme militants from both the left and right wing of the political spectrum, came together to organize a national march to London. Participants included the fascist Oswald Mosley and leading figures in the Communist Party, like Arthur Horner. Preparations began in February 1930, bringing together workers from Scotland, Wales, and the north of England, marching against the Labour government’s policies toward the workers. Despite its unwillingness to negotiate, the government was prepared to offer overnight accommodation to the marchers at the numerous Victorian workhouses prevalent along the marchers’ route. Combined with this conciliatory gesture came the condition that any food provided to the protesters would be below the standard of nutrition provided to the workhouses’ regular inhabitants, which, to the contemporary observer, would be almost unimaginable. Nevertheless, this was an offer duly declined by leaders of the march, and marchers declared clearly their preference to spend the night out of doors rather than resorting to the humiliation to which their ancestors were previously subjected in the much-loathed Victorian workhouse. The most considerable protests against the means test were seen in Wales, a country that had the highest density of unemployment within a given area, and where protests intensified and occasionally became violent. The Communist Party, which remained marginalized throughout the rest of Britain, proved considerably influential within the South Wales valleys, largely as a consequence of the deep-rooted left-wing political values of its citizens, accentuated by their entrenchment in a long industrial history of coal mining. Their extreme left-wing views acted as a consolidating force to trade unions and motivated movements toward direct action. Anger amongst these groups toward the Labour Party, who appeared disinterested in the plight of the workers, remained a feature of grassroots political sentiments. The NUWM, created as a representative force for an unemployed population that now numbered, on average, one in every three people, emphasized the importance of consolidation and unity on a local level. One of the major causes of the protests against this system was the lack of uniformity in the application of financial assistance regulations. There were severe anomalies which created considerable resentment amongst claimants. For example, certain areas in southern England were awarded higher payments than their counterparts in northern England. Variations also existed within Wales, with certain areas of the Glamorganshire Valleys benefiting more than their counterparts. The major contributory factor to this anomaly was the implicit statutory stipulation that gave discretionary powers to the public assistance officers in their allocation of benefits. Their presence as assessors operating in a relatively autonomous fashion, subject only to limited government control, ensured the eschewal of arbitrary and centralized financial control. Protests against the means test were becoming prominent by 1931. In January, a protest was organized by workers in London’s Battersea area, incorporating thousands of workers. The protest gathered strength as it progressed down London’s Embankment toward Temple Underground Station. A procession through Oxford Street led by the prominent Red Communist flag and accompanied by brass bands and people International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 Britain, trade union movement 525 singing the Internationale caused some disorder, bringing traffic on the busy London streets to a standstill. However, the original plan to march on to Whitehall was aborted, with the protesters diverting toward London’s Hyde Park instead. Nevertheless, the events in London acted largely as a catalyst for the cathartic outburst that was to be witnessed in Britain later that decade. Unemployment had reached three million and was not declining, but harsh governmental treatment of the protesters merely reinforced the conviction that the government had not changed its outlook toward trade unionists and the unemployed since the days of the general strike. The militaristic and authoritarian fashion in which protesters were treated, with many suffering injuries at the hands of police on horseback, led to dissenting voices amongst the popular press, especially the left-wing newspapers, who expressed their disgust. The New Statesman was one of many newspapers contributing to the condemnatory tone expressed toward the government for their actions during this time. and trade unionism, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin refused to meet the marchers or enter into any negotiations. Likewise, the petition presented by the marchers to parliament merely fell on deaf ears, symbolizing the government’s refusal to address the workers’ plight. News traveled very quickly, and it was not long before the masses of unemployed throughout the nation knew the fate that befell their Jarrow comrades. As a consequence, winning the support of the working class for government employment initiatives became increasingly more difficult. Protests against British Work Centers In the latter half of the 1930s, the Commissioners for the Special Areas concluded their investigations with findings largely reinforcing trade unionists’ claims that British employment policy had, for the previous two decades, been inadequate. As a final attempt to address this issue before the onset of war, the government sought to redefine the problem of unemployment into an issue of retraining. The government committee created to examine the issue of unemployment concluded that by retraining workers with new skills, diversity and transferable skills would create greater employability in a range of areas and specializations through the provision of Work Centers. The first Work Centers were opened in London in 1938 and were greeted in an unfavorable way by the trade unions. The workers protested against a program which they claimed presented them in an unfavorable light. Their position as unemployed workers was presented as evidence of their fecklessness by the government, which described them as “workshy.” As a result of this attitude, the government linked payment of unemployment benefit to attendance at a Work Center. This, largely reminiscent to the days of the much-loathed Victorian workhouses, did very little to aid the government’s efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the working classes, and in fact did more to provoke further unrest and resentment. Some refused to attend, while others refused to cooperate when they attended the centers. The main cause for concern among trade unionists was that this system would once again create major anomalies, further deepening the inequality cleavage between the unemployed The Jarrow March By 1936, Britain was suffering from the worst effects of the Great Depression, and a Royal Commission was deployed under the guidance of Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain to investigate ways to create employment in the areas worst affected. The findings of the Investigative Commissioners were echoed somewhat by King Edward VIII during his brief visit to South Wales in November 1936, when he observed the abject poverty of the unemployed masses and concluded that “something must be done.” Tacitly reflecting his despair at the perceived government inaction, the king’s comments merely reiterated in a more conciliatory tone the sentiments of the Jarrow marchers. This group was led by the Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson (affectionately known as “Red Ellen”) in June 1936 in a 300-mile march to London to present a petition for the construction of a steelworks in the area to reinvigorate employment there. This northern English town had, the previous year, been decimated by the closure of its lifeblood, Palmers Shipyard, which left 70 percent of its population unemployed with very little prospect of obtaining further employment. Despite his previously conciliatory gestures toward protesters International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 519–526 526 Britain, women’s suffrage campaign masses and wider society. Trade unionists believed that men at the Work Centers would be producing the goods that were already produced by the few who were fortunate to be employed. Even worse, for their effort they would only receive unemployment payments, which were a fraction of the ordinary wage. However, the Unemployment Assistance Board, which was responsible for coordinating the activities of the Work Centers, argued that the goods produced by the workers were for training purposes only, and would not be sold to the commercial market. This did much to quell the original suspicions of the unionists of government exploitation of the workers. The government argued that the purpose of the Work Center was to train the men in new skills, thus increasing their employability, and to keep them fit until they could find alternative work. The 1930s in Britain witnessed numerous trade union protests which in themselves created a considerable impact. However, the nature of the protests evolved in this period as unions leaned their lessons from the mistakes of the 1926 general strike, realizing that successful protests meant that numerous tactics needed to be deployed. With the onset of war in 1939, though, despite a few dissenting voices within the trade unions, most began to see collaboration between the government and the unions as essential in the national interest for the mobilization of workers on the home front to defeat the fascist enemy. SEE ALSO: Britain, Post-World War I Army Mutinies and Revolutionary Threats; Britain, PostWorld War II Political Protest; Britain, Strikes, 1905– 1926; British Miners’ Strike, 1984–1985; Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844); Chartists; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; Glasgow General Strike, 1820; Labour Party, Britain; Place, Francis (1771–1854); Poor Law, Britain, 1834; Red Scotland and the Scottish Radical Left, 1880–1932; Wales, Nationalist Protest, 19th Century Police in Modern British Society. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Kingsford, P. (1982) The Hunger Marchers in Britain, 1920–40. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Pelling, H. (1971) A History of British Trade Unionism, 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Skidelsky, R. (1970) Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929–1931. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Taylor, A. J. P. (1967) English History. London: Readers’ Union. Williamson, P. (1982) Safety First: Baldwin, the Conservative Party and the 1929 General Election. Historical Journal 25. References and Suggested Readings Clarke, P. (1996) Hope and Glory: Britain 1900–1990. London: Penguin. Cohen, M. (1946) I Was One of the Unemployed. London: Victor Gollancz. Constantine, S. (1980) Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars. London: Longman. Evans, N. (1999) South Wales Has Been Roused as Never Before: Marching against the Means Test, 1934–36. In D. W. Howell et al., Crime, Protest and