Government formation in the National Assembly for Wales moreCo-authored with Rosanne Palmer and Stephen Thornton, Published in No Overall Control? The impact of a ‘hung parliament’ on British politics, (ed.) Alex Brazier and Susanna Kalitowski |
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Social History, Nationalism, Elections and Voting Behavior, Gender History, Voting Behavior, Devolution, politics and social poilicy, Politics of Devolution in the UKPolitical Representation European Union Politics Research Design and Methodology, Elections, Welsh History, Women's History, Political Economy, Politics of Devolution in the UK; Political Representation; European Union Politics; Research Design and Methodology, and Politics of Devolution in the UK
Government formation in the National Assembly for Wales
Chapter 8 Government formation in the National Assembly for Wales
Rosanne Palmer, Stephen Thornton and Mark Crowley
The aim of this chapter is to consider the experience of the National Assembly for Wales with regard to government formation and party cooperation since its establishment in 1999. The introduction of an electoral system with an element of proportionality, and the existence of a party system that differs from the one that exists at the UK level, clearly differentiate government formation in Wales from the process of government formation that takes place at Westminster. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn in terms of the adaptation of political behaviour amongst parties, as both they and the Welsh public adjust to the need for coalition-building and bargaining occasioned by the outcomes of elections to the National Assembly. The establishment of the National Assembly for Wales through the 1998 Government of Wales Act changed the context in which the political parties in Wales operate. Candidates seek election to a 60-seat assembly through the Additional Member System (AMS), a form of proportional representation, similar - though not identical in its details - to the system used in the federal republic of Germany.1 Forty seats are directly elected via First Past the Post, using familiar Westminster constituencies. The other 20 seats are allocated according to votes cast on regional lists, with the regions based on the pre-1999 constituency boundaries for European Parliament elections. Under AMS, single-party majorities are widely assumed to be the exception rather than the rule.2 This has proved the case in Wales since 1999 as, in the three post-devolution elections, although Labour has remained throughout the largest party in terms of the electoral support that it attracts, it has been unable to attain the type of dominance that Labour has achieved at Westminster during this period, or indeed that Labour achieved in Wales itself prior to devolution. At Westminster, the Labour
M. Cole (2001), ‘Elections to the Welsh Assembly: Proportionality, Continuity and Change’, Regional and Federal Studies, 11(2), pp xx. 2 Ibid, p. 151.
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Party has, since 1997, never held less than three-quarters of the seats available in Wales; in Cardiff Bay, as will be illustrated, it is exceptional for Labour to gain even half the available seats. The Welsh Assembly elections
Table 1: 1999 election results Party Labour Plaid Conservative Liberal Democrats Other Constituency seats 27 9 1 3 * List seats 1 8 8 3 * Total 28 17 9 6 *
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/vote_99/wales_99/html/azindex.stm
Following the first devolved elections, which took place in May 1999, Labour became the largest party in the Assembly, but it lacked an overall majority (see Table 1). This was a surprise as Labour had been widely expected to win over half the available seats, even with the introduction of a more proportional system.3 Rather than attempting to form a coalition, the First Minister, Alun Michael, tried to maintain a minority government. This administration proved to be unstable, suffering both from internal difficulties - many believing Michael to have been imposed on Labour Party activists in Wales by the party leadership in London - and repeated challenges from the three opposition parties in the Assembly. Michael subsequently resigned in February 2000 in order to pre-empt being brought down by a vote of no-confidence tied to the issue of achieving matched funding for the Objective 1 Structural Funds for West Wales and the Valleys.4 He was replaced as First Minister by Rhodri Morgan, an individual less marked by the imprimatur of the UK Labour government. With Michael’s departure, coalition negotiations with the Liberal Democrats flourished, and, in October 2000, a Labour/Liberal Democrat government was formed which included two Liberal Democrats in the nine-member cabinet. This coalition provided the stability of an effective overall majority of nine, and endured until the second devolved elections in May 2003. For these elections Labour deliberately campaigned to
M. Cole (2001), ‘Elections to the Welsh Assembly: Proportionality, Continuity and Change’, Regional and Federal Studies 11(2), pp. 155-6. 4 At the Presiding Officer’s insistence, the vote of no-confidence was held with the opposition parties defeating Labour by 31 votes to 27 with 1 abstention.
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achieve a single-party majority.5 The election returned Welsh Labour with 30 seats, with the opposition parties also gaining 30 seats collectively (see Table 2). With the Presiding Officer - the assembly’s equivalent of the Speaker in the Commons - being drawn from the opposition party ranks 6, this allowed Labour to form an effective one-seat majority administration, rather than agreeing a new partnership with the Liberal Democrats and renewing the coalition.
Table 2: 2003 election results Party Labour Plaid Conservative Liberal Democrats Other Constituency seats 30 5 1 3 16 List seats 0 7 10 3 * Total 30 12 11 6 1
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2003/vote_2003/default.stm
In terms of party performance, it is clear that Labour’s position had improved slightly since 1999. The ‘biggest loser’ in 2003 was Plaid Cymru, as the party failed to extend the unexpected gains made in 1999.7 Indeed, Plaid saw a 33% decline in its share of the vote, lost five seats, and was largely pegged back once more to within its traditional northern and southwestern strongholds. Despite Plaid looking inward following its relatively poor electoral performance, Labour’s decision to govern with a single-seat majority was always likely to prove a precarious option. This was indeed borne out, particularly once Peter Law, AM for Blaenau Gwent, left Labour’s ranks in protest against the insistence upon an all-female shortlist for the Westminster election in his constituency in spring 2005, and took Labour’s one-seat majority with him. Subsequently, the Labour administration suffered a series of policy defeats in the Assembly as it struggled once again to maintain a minority administration. Law’s death in April 2006 did little to improve Labour’s position as Law’s widow, Trish, won the resulting by-election as an Independent. In this context, the build-up to the May 2007 elections was largely dominated by discussions of potential coalition partnerships between the four main parties.
R. Wyn Jones & R. Scully (2003), ‘Election Report: Wales 2003’, Regional and Federal Studies 13(2), pp. 125-132. The Assembly’s Presiding Officer from 1999 onwards has been Plaid Cymru’s Lord (Dafydd) Elis-Thomas. His deputy, from 2003 to 2007, was John Marek, elected as a Labour AM in 1999, but who stood as an Independent in 2003. 7 L. McAllister (2004), ‘Steady State or Second Order? The 2003 Elections to the National Assembly for Wales’ The Political Quarterly 75(1), pp. 73–82.
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Table 3: 2007 election results Party Labour Plaid Conservative Liberal Democrats Other Constituency seats 24 7 5 3 18 List seats 2 8 7 3 * Total 26 15 12 6 1
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/vote2007/welshasssembly_english/html/region_99999.stm
The Assembly election of 3 May 2007 delivered a fresh blow to Welsh Labour, reducing their number of seats, thus making a minority administration even more difficult to maintain. Plaid and the Conservatives both gained seats, with the Conservatives achieving a noticeable improvement in the number of constituency seats won, though most of this was offset by the resultant reduction in their share of the number of list seats. The Liberal Democrats remained on six seats for the third successive Assembly election, the one resoundingly static feature of the whole devolution process. With the largest party gaining only 26 seats, four short of a majority (assuming that the Presiding Officer was to be elected from the opposition ranks), a coalition was the probable outcome (see Table 3). That outcome was not swift to arrive, with negotiations taking two months - although not protracted in comparison with many other coalition negotiations, such as those following the Belgian elections in 2007 – which did attract some critical comment from the local media, being described as ‘tortuous’ in the Western Mail on 19 September 2007. The coalitionbuilding negotiations were certainly complex, and, at various stages, encompassed all four parties. Three main permutations appeared possible: Labour-Liberal Democrat; Plaid-Conservative-Liberal Democrat (the socalled ‘rainbow’ coalition) and Labour-Plaid. Initially, the traditional LabourLiberal Democrat combination seemed the most likely result, but - to considerable surprise - the Liberal Democrat Party executive failed to support the proposed coalition. Speaking to Wales on Sunday on 23 September 2007, First Minister Morgan suggested: ‘The margin between opposition and government – and defeat and victory – is incredibly small, and how the Liberal Party conducted itself during those periods was a source of great mystification to all of us, to be honest.’
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Trish Law AM. John Marek, Independent AM following the 2003 election, lost his seat.
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The ‘rainbow’ coalition was then touted as the probable outcome, but negotiations ended in acrimony, with parties blaming each other for the breakdown, though again the Liberal Democrats seemed to be the focus for particular censure. The eventual outcome, a Labour-Plaid administration with three Plaid ministers out of nine - seemed, at the outset, the most unlikely of all the permutations, not least because, in March, such an arrangement had been explicitly ruled out by the then Labour secretary of state for Wales, Peter Hain, apparently reflecting the stance of many Labour figures in Westminster.9 Nevertheless, despite loud protests from certain sections of both parties, Labour and Plaid did form a coalition, one that has delivered the largest majority ever to support a Welsh Assembly government, holding 41 of the Assembly’s 60 seats. It is, essentially, Wales’ first ‘grand coalition’, bringing together the two parties holding the largest number of seats in the Assembly. Thus, in the three Assembly elections since 1999, it can be seen that the commanding position of the Labour Party in Wales in Westminster elections has not been converted into a similar dominance of the National Assembly. This is despite the fact that the Labour Party has consistently been the largest group in the Assembly and has been present in every Welsh Assembly government to date. As Table 4 makes plain, rather than being the norm, the formation of a majority Labour administration has been an exception in a nascent pattern of minority and coalition governments.
Table 4: Welsh Assembly Governments 1999-2007 Date Government type July 1999 – February 2000 Minority administration (First Minister Michael) February 2000 – October 2000 Minority administration (First Minister Morgan) October 2000 – April 2003 Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition May 2003 – May 2005 Majority administration10 May 2005 – April 2007 Minority administration11 July 2007 Labour-Plaid coalition
Differences between Westminster and Cardiff The different electoral systems used at Westminster and Cardiff do, clearly, influence government formation. As noted, the AMS system used for the Assembly elections - though not completely proportional - is more likely to
House of Commons Debates, 1 Mar 2007, vol. 457, no. 52, col. 1109. Lord Dafydd Elis Thomas (Plaid) was re-elected Presiding Officer of the Assembly. 11 Peter Law left the Labour Party’s ranks in May 2005.
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deliver coalition or minority governments than Westminster’s majoritarian system, and this largely explains the pattern of minority and coalition governments that have formed in Wales, in contrast to the tradition of single-party government in London. For those accustomed to the Westminster model, one aspect of the AMS electoral system used in Wales that appears particularly curious is that parties which are successful in the constituency vote appear to be penalised by being effectively limited in the number of list seats they are able to gain. This can clearly be shown by looking at the percentages of the vote gained by parties in the list ballot. For example, Welsh Labour, at all three Assembly elections, has topped the regional list vote (see Table 5 for percentage result of 2003 election), but has always received fewer seats than any of the other main parties as a consequence of the number of constituency seats it wins outright. Indeed, at the 2003 election, Labour received no list seats at all, despite winning 36.6% of the list vote.
Table 5: Percentage of vote won in 2003 Party Labour Plaid Cymru Conservatives Liberal Democrats 1st vote 40.0% 21.2% 19.9% 14.1% 2nd vote 36.6% 19.7% 19.2% 12.7%
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/vote2003/welsh_assembly/html/main_scoreboard.stm
Another important distinction relates to party systems. The UK at parliamentary level is generally characterised as a two-party system with government formation dominated by Labour and the Conservatives, though with the Liberal Democrats placed as a significant third party. For Assembly elections, Wales is regarded as a multi-party system, with Plaid Cymru, a party specific to Wales, adding to the mix. Significantly, Plaid tends to receive proportionally more votes at Assembly elections than it does for Westminster elections. Indeed it appears that voters generally treat Assembly and Westminster elections differently, and cast their votes accordingly.12 Voters who vote for Plaid in Assembly elections tend to place greater emphasis on Welsh issues and regard Assembly elections as representing a very different contest to Westminster elections.13 Many who do not vote for Plaid in UK-wide elections are prepared to at the Assembly
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R. Scully (2004), ‘Business as usual? Comparing Westminster and National Assembly Elections in Wales’, Contemporary Wales, 16(1), pp. 75-82. Ibid, p. 80.
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level where there appears to be a greater sense that this vote will ‘count’. This success led to Plaid, as the second-largest party, becoming the official opposition in the Assembly, a position it has only recently relinquished when it became a partner in the coalition government formed after the 2007 elections. In contrast, at Westminster, Plaid is considered a minor party, only seeming to matter during those few occasions where a government has depended on the support of other parties to maintain a majority in Parliament, most notably during James Callaghan’s minority Labour administration, 1976-79. Incidentally, since 1999, all the other main parties in the Assembly have attempted to emphasise a distinct Welsh identity, the most famous example being First Minister Morgan’s identification of ‘clear red water’ running between the carefully branded ‘Welsh Labour’ and the more metropolitan ‘New Labour’.14 The Conservatives are Wales’ third party, though they are very close to being second. At the 2007 election, the Conservatives secured 218,730 constituency votes to Plaid’s 219,121, and, in the list, had a lead of 209,153 to 204,757, though the vagaries of AMS meant they ended with two fewer constituency seats and one fewer regional seats than Plaid.15 Never as dominant in Wales as in the wider UK, particularly in England, the Conservative Party suffered a particularly dramatic Welsh electoral decline beginning in the late 1980s - one which reached its nadir at the 1997 general election, where, at the Westminster-level at least, they ended the night without a speck of blue remaining on the political map of Wales. Though the Conservatives have since recovered some ground, there are still only three Conservative MPs representing Welsh constituencies. In contrast, at Assembly elections, the Conservatives have always maintained a strong presence, initially almost entirely because the AMS system compensated their broad, but rarely focused, support into seats on the regional lists. However, as noted, at the most recent Assembly elections, the Conservatives have bolstered their representation in the ‘traditional’ constituencies. Moreover, following the formation of the Labour-Plaid coalition, the Conservatives are - as in Westminster - currently the official opposition in the Assembly. Of the four main parties in the Assembly, the Liberal Democrats have maintained the smallest representation, having gained a steady six seats in
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R. Morgan (2002), ‘Making social policy in Wales’, Lecture by the First Minister Rhodri Morgan to the Centre for Policy Studies, Swansea University. Institute of Welsh Politics (2007), National Assembly for Wales Election 2007 (Aberystwyth: Institute of Welsh Politics).
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all three devolved elections to date, representation equally divided between constituency and list. Nevertheless, the Liberal Democrats have, until recently, enjoyed a strong bargaining position through being the ‘natural’ coalition partner for Labour, and indeed becoming junior coalition partner between 2000 and 2003. However, unlike Scotland, where, until the election of the Scottish Parliament in May 2007, Labour-Liberal Democrat government had been maintained from 1999 onwards, in Wales the relationship between the parties has proved more unpredictable. Even in circumstances where coalition seemed a likely event, such as in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 election, there has been a reluctance to consummate their relationship by forming a government together. Frostiness in Labour ranks has often been regarded as the main barrier, Deacon suggesting that ‘Labour in Wales did not want a coalition … the concept of a coalition government was quite alien to its nature.’16 However Liberal Democrats have also displayed considerable coquettishness, a trait most recently and dramatically demonstrated by the unexpected rejection of the coalition agreement with Labour by the Liberal Democrat executive following the 2007 Assembly election. Thus, though a little stronger in Cardiff than at Westminster - where there are four Liberal Democrat MPs representing Welsh seats - the surprise here is that they are not more influential considering their ideological proximity to Labour and their traditional enthusiasm for coalition government. A final distinction between Westminster and Cardiff to be mentioned here relates to elite political behaviour. In contrast to the adversarial style that characterises Westminster politics, the Assembly is marked by a more consensual attitude. In the Assembly, first names are commonly used, and there has been reference to ‘a cosy “group hug” atmosphere’.17 However, given that, at one stage, much was made about the formation of a ‘new’ more consensual form of politics in Wales18, and that the system in Wales encourages minority or coalition government, one could expect that the distinction between Westminster and Cardiff would be greater. The most obvious demonstration that old habits are hard to kick is the reluctance to form a coalition government, unless every other avenue has been explored. Indeed, more generally, there appears a reluctance on the part of parties to
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R. Deacon (2007), ‘The Welsh Liberal Democrats: From Government to Opposition and Then Back Again?,’ The Political Quarterly, 78(1), p. 159. McAllister quoted in ‘As One Wales pact is signed, Ieuan says ‘this is where the work begins’’, 19 September 2007. L. McAllister (2000), ‘The New Politics in Wales: Rhetoric or Reality?’ Parliamentary Affairs 53, pp. 591604; P. Chaney & R. Fevre (2001), ‘Ron Davies and the cult of ‘inclusiveness’: Devolution and Participation in Wales’, Contemporary Wales
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accept that single-party majority governments are the least likely outcome of Assembly elections, and to anticipate the need to co-operate. This is particularly the case at the local level, where party rivalry is often intense. The messy negotiation period following the 2007 election reinforces the point that post-devolution parties need to get to grips with a new type of government formation. Nevertheless, that the end result of this bargaining was coalition between two historical adversaries suggests that this process maybe starting in earnest. Conclusion The clear message from Wales is that political parties in the UK can adapt to a system where single-party majority government is the exception rather than the rule. Minority, and ‘only-just’ majority, administrations have been maintained over relatively long stretches of time and, if push comes to shove, all parties have demonstrated a willingness to co-operate to form coalition government. However it needs to be highlighted that this process has proved a difficult one, and is really only taking place because the electoral system has forced changes. There is evidence that party elites are adapting their tactics to accommodate a game that involves the strong possibility of multi-party government, but, to some extent, many party members, the Welsh public and media are still trying to play the game according to the old Westminster rules. The authors are grateful to Pete Dorey, Reader in British politics, Cardiff University, for his helpful comments
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